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of a frequently used path. 9 In such cases the important questions
are the frequency of use of the tracks by pedestrians, and the
railway's knowledge of such use. In determining a reasonable
rate of speed for driving in a city the density of population may
be a very important factor. For example, the court held in Nolan
v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" that the railroad company
is not held to the same strict accountability when the train is
being operated within the city limits in a section that is not populated as it is when it operates through a thickly populated city
21
or town.
In deciding the instant case, the court logically followed the
established jurisprudence in this state that the railroad is under
no duty to keep a lookout for occasional trespassers, whether
adults or children; and that the train may travel in open country,
at the highest possible speed that is consistent with the safety of
its passengers.
M. E. C.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR-BURDEN OF PRooF-While an employee of
the defendant was engaged in filling the gas tank of a bus in the
defendant's station, a fire occurred which destroyed the bus station and the plaintiff's adjoining automobile repair shop. In a suit
for damages the plaintiff invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur'
and contended that where res ipsa loquitur is applied, it is not
only incumbent upon the defendant to refute negligence on the
part of its employees, but that he must also affirmatively show the
exact cause of the fire. Conceding the applicability of this doctrine, the court declared that the defendant is not required to account for the occurrence and show the actual cause of the injury,
but merely to rebut the inference that he failed to use'due care.
Davis v. Teche Lines, Incorporated, 200 La. 1, 7 So. (2d) 365
(1942).
In most jurisdictions when harm occurs under circumstances
which, from common experience strongly suggest negligence, and
when the instrumentality which occasioned the harm is under exclusive control and management of the defendant so that he is in
19. Jones v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 162 La. 690, 111 So. 62 (1926); Miller
v. Baldwin, 178 So. 717 (La. App. 1938).
20. 145 La. 483, 82 So. 590 (1919).

21. 145 La. at 488, 82 So. at 592.
1. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine see Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases (1941)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 70.
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better position to prove his innocence than the plaintiff is to prove
his negligence, the courts apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur"the thing speaks for itself." 2 In Byrne v. Boadle,3 leading case on
res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff was walking in a public street past
the defendant's shop when a barrel of flour fell upon him from a
window above the shop and seriously injured him. The court
said, "the fact of its falling is prima facie evidence of negligence,
and the plaintiff who was injured by it is not bound to show
that it could not fall without negligence, but if there are any
facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove
them." In such cases knowledge of the true cause of the injury is
easily accessible to the defendant and is usually inaccessible to
the plaintiff. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine operates to relieve the
plaintiff from the burden of producing direct evidence of negligence by creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The
decisions are not all in harmony, however, as to-the extent of this
advantage afforded the plaintiff, and the effect to be given it.
Authority divides in three directions: (1) an inference of negligenc'e so that the jury may find the defendant negligent in the
absence of rebutting evidence; (2) a presumption where the jury
will not merely be permitted to infer the defendant's negligence,
but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, will be required to
do so; and (3) an inference of negligence shifting the burden of
proof on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evi4
dence that the injury was not caused by his negligence.
Louisiana courts have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to automobile accidents,5 fires," explosionsT injuries sustained
2. See Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 183, § 77.
3. 2 H. & C. 722 Ex. (1863).
4. Harper, op. cit. supra note 2, at 184-185, § 77; Heckel and Harper,
Effects of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724, 729
et seq.; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936) 20 Minn.
L. Rev. 241, 245-247.
5. Lawson v. Nossek, 15 La. App. 207, 130 So. 669 (1930) (guests of the
defendant were injured in auto accident); Monkhouse v. Johns, 142 So. 347
(La. App. 1932) (car ran off the road and into a tree); Loprestie v. Roy
Motors, Inc., 181 So. 60 (La. App. 1938) (auto accident); Harrelson v. McCook,
198 So. 532 (La. App. 1940) (auto left highway and went into ditch); Nuss
v. MacKenzie, 4 So. (2d) 845 (La. App. 1942) (auto collision).
6. Dotson v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 144 La. 78, 80 So. 205 (1918)
(employee in defendant's sawmill lost his life In a fire which destroyed the
mill); Gershner v. Gulf Refining Co., 171 So. 399 (La. App. 1936) (wile defendant was putting gas in car, gas splashed on plaintiff and he caught fire);
Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936) (damage to
plaintiff's building caused by fire where defendant filling station was in
control); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (La. App. 1939) (defendant was
using a blow torch in repairing auto when the auto caught on fire).
7. Harrell v. Gulf and Valley Cotton Oil Co., 15 La. App. 603, 131 So.
709 (1930) (defendant's deodorizing tank exploded killing a nearby employee);
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from falling objects,8 persons drowning,9 accidental electrocutions,10 and consumption of foreign matter contained in foodstuff9,11 and have had no trouble with these common law distinctions. They have generally held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur creates a prima facie case of negligence which may be
overcome by the defendant's explanation that he had used due
care.1 2 It is further held that the defendant, in order to exonerate
himself, is not required to allege and prove the specific cause of
the injury. 3 The decisions have explained the defendant's burden
by a number of confusing phrases: "to show absence of negliDrago v. Dorsey, 13 La. App. 115, 126 So. 724 (1930) (child crushed by falling
of fence due to explosion of defendant's boiler); Motor Sales and Service
Co. v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1931) (defendant
was transporting acid when drum opened and acid spilled on plaintiff); Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service, 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938) (Coca-Cola bottle
burst and glass cut plaintiff).
8. Noble v. Southland Lbr. Co., 4 La. App. 281 (1926) (injury sustained
where plank fell on plaintiff's head at lumber yard); Pizzitola v. Letellier
Transfer Co., 167 So. 158 (La. App. 1936) (injury resulted from a fall of a
bale of paper off a truck).
9. Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 So.
132, 141 (La. App. 1936) (boy drowned in swimming pool).
.10. Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, Light & Waterworks Co., 111 La. 522,
35 So. 731 (1903) (person electrocuted by wire lying in a street).
11. Costello v. Morrison Cafeteria Co. of La., 135 So. 245 (La. App. 1931)
(defendant restaurant served petitioner cream cheese unfit to eat); Hill v.
Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 So. 45 (La. App. 1936) (plaintiff swallowed glass while drinking Coca-Cola).
12. Willis v. Vicksburg, 115 La. 53, 38 So. 892 (1905) (explain absence of
negligence); Lykiardopoulo v. New Orleans & C. R., Light and Power Co.,
127 La. 309, 53 So. 575 (1910) (absence of negligence); Dotson v. Louisiana
Central Lumber Co., 144 La. 78, 80 So. 205 (1918) (burden upon defendant to
show absence of negligence); Noble v. Southland Lbr. Co., 4 La. App. 281
(1926) (burden on defendant to show absence of negligence); Vargas v. Blue
Seal Bottling Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930) (defendant must show
he did nothing he should not have done and neglected no duty to plaintiff);
Lawson v. Nossek, 15 La. App. 207, 130 So. 669 (1930) (presumption of want
of due'care not conclusive); Motor Sales and Service Co. v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1931) (effect of res ipsa loquitur is
merely to give defendant the burden of overcoming presumption of negligence
by showing due care); Monkhouse v. Johns, 142 So. 347 (La. App. 1932)
(burden on defendant to adduce proof explanatory of negligence imputed to
him); Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936) (inference of negligence in absence of defendant showing exercise of due care);
Gershner v. Gulf Refining Co., 171 So. 399 (La. App. 1936) (defendant must explain due care); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (La. App. 1939) (defendant must show absence of negligence on his part); Harrelson v. McCook, 198
So. 532 (La. App. 1940) (defendant must show absence of negligence); Nuss
v. MacKenzie, 4 So. (2d) 845 (La. App. 1942) (defendant must show due care);
Davis v. Teche Lines, Inc., 200 La. 1, 7 So. (2d) 365 (1942) (defendant must
show due care).
13. Gershner v. Gulf Refining Co., 171 So. 399 (La. App. 1936) (defendant
not required to allege and prove the particular act of the injury); Gulf Ins.
Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (La. App. 1939) (he need not show actual cause).
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gence,' 1 4 "to show due care,' ' 15 "to explain the cause of the accident to escape inference of negligence."' 16 Apparently these
phrases are accepted as synonymous, as a combination of two of
them may be found in the same case to express the same meaning. 7 The present case has subscribed to the majority Louisiana
view by accepting and approving the general statement of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur as stated in Corpus Juris: "whdre the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under
the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by the
defendant, but the presumption or inference is overcome and rebutted if the defendant's explanation is sufficient to rebut the
inference that he had failed to use due care."' 18
However, a number of Louisiana cases appear to be in conflict with this rule. In Dye v. American Beverage Company, 9 a
suit to recover damages for illness resulting from consumption of
bottled beverages alleged to contain unwholesome foreign substance, the prima facie case was not overcome by the defendant
corporation's evidence that it operated a modem sanitary bottling
plant and that it was improbable that foreign matter could have
entered the product during the process of manufacture. In Hill
0
the court held that
v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Company2
14. Willis v. Vicksburg, 115 La. 53, 38 So. 892 (1905); Dotson v. Louisiana
Central Lumber Co., 144 La. 78, 80 So. 205 (1918); Noble v. Southland Lbr. Co.,
4 La. App. 281 (1926); Motor Sales and Service Co. v. Grasselli Chemical Co.,
15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1931); Monkhouse v. Johns, 142 So. 347 (La.
App. 1932); Gershner v. Gulf Refining Co., 171 So. 399 (La. App. 1936); Gulf
Ins. Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (La. App. 1939); Harrelson v. McCook, 198 So.
532 (La. App. 1940); Nuss v. MacKenzie, 4 So. (2d) 845 (La. App. 1942).
15. Willis v. Vicksburg, 115 La. 53, 38 So. 892 (1905); Noble v. Southland
Lbr. Co., 4 La. App. 281 (1926); Motor Sales and Service Co. v. Grasselli
Chemical Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1931); Jones v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (La.
App. 1939); Nuss v. MacKenzie, 4 So. (2d) 845 (La. App. 1942); Davis v.
Teche Lines, Inc., 200 La. 1, 7 So. (2d) 365 (1942).
16. Monkhouse v. Johns, 142 So. 347 (La. App. 1932); Jones v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936); Gershner v. Gulf Refining
Co., 171 So. 399 (La. App. 1936).
17. See cases cited in notes 14, 15, and 16, supra.
18. 45 C. J. 1193, § 768 (1928); Gershner v. Gulf Refining Co., 171 So. 399,
401 (La. App. 1936); Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 185 La. 1067, 1071, 171
So. 447 (1936); Davis v. Teche Lines, Inc., 200 La.. 1, 7, 7 So. (2d) 365, 367
(1942).
19. 194 So. 438 (La. App. 1940).
20. 170 So. 45 (La. App. 1936) (plaintiff swallowed glass while drinking
Coca-Cola).
See also Freeman v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 179 So.
621 (La. App. 1938) (plaintiff swallowed particles of glass while drinking
Coca-Cola); Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service, 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938) (Coca-
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the defendant, to excuse itself from liability, must prove that the
foreign substance did not enter the product during bottling or
manufacturing process. The same view was recently adopted by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works,"'
where the plaintiff was injured when a bottle of root beer exploded. In that case the defendant was found negligent notwithstanding the showing that they purchased bottles from a reputable manufacturer, and that gas gauges used in the bottling process prevented any excessive gas pressure in bottles. In these
"bottling cases" it appears that proving due care or even a high
degree of care in the bottling process will avail the defendant
nothing. He must virtually prove that the deleterious substance
could not have entered his product during the bottling process.
When a bottled beverage explodes or contains a deleterious substance, the bottling company is confronted with an almost irrebuttable presumption of negligence. This unique application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not really achieve any exceptional result when one compares it with the decisions in other
jurisdictions which also hold the bottling company to a strict
liability upon a contractual theory of implied warranty of fit22
ness.
A comparison of the instant decision and the recent Ortego
case indicates that there are two clearly recognizable classifications concerning the effect of the prima facie case of negligence
Cola bottle burst and glass cut plaintiff); Hollis v. Ouachita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., Ltd., 196 So. 376 (La. App. 1940) (dead spider in Coca-Cola);
Jenkins v. Bogalusa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1 So. (2d) 426 (La. App. 1941)
(dead spider in bottle).
The same rule was applied in one case where defendant restaurant

served petitioner cream cheese unfit to eat. Costello v. Morrison Cafeteria
Co., 135 So. 245. (La. App. 1931).

21. 199 La. 599, 6 So. (2d) 677 (1942).

See also Auzenne v. Gulf Public

Service, 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938).
22. See note (1942) 4 LOUISINA LAW REVIEW 606 for a comparison of
the contract and tort theories of liability.
The courts that hold the
bottling company on the "warranty" theory reason that since the consumer

is without opportunity to inspect for himself when he buys a bottled beverage, he has a right to rely upon the "implied warranty" of the manufacturer
that the contents are fit for human consumption. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278 (1927); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co.,
189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Hertzler v. Manshum, 237 Mich. 289, 211
N.W. 754 (1927); Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss.
315, 95 So. 444 (1923); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111
So. 305 (1927); Chenault v. Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 Miss. 366,
118 So. 177 (1928); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130

So. 479, 72 A.L.R. 143 (1930); Madouras v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W. (2d) 445 (1936); Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 104 S.W. (2d) 773 (Mo. App. 1937); Ritchie v. Sheffield Farms Co., 129
Misc. 765, 222 N.Y. Supp. 724 (1927); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 102

Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97
S.W. (2d) 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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confronting the defendant in res ipsa loquitur situations. In the
"bottling cases" as illustrated by the Ortego decision, the presumption of negligence is almost irrebuttable. In other situations
the prima facie case may be rebutted by merely showing that the
defendant used due care. This approach to the problem is nicely
illustrated by the Davis decision. In that case the Louisiana Supreme Court confirms prior Louisiana jurisprudence as to thie
general effect of the burden of proof in res ipsa loquitur cases,
and recognizes the distinction between merely requiring the defendant to show due care and requiring him to specifically account for the occurrence.
J.J.C.

TORTS-AUTOMOBILES-RIGHT OF WAY-CONFLICTING AND CONCURRING REGULATIONS-Plaintiff was driving east while defendant
approached from the south, plaintiff's right. Defendant slowed
perceptibly, and plaintiff, assuming he would stop, did not further
notice him. They collided in the middle of the intersection.
Plaintiff claimed right of way under the city ordinance' which
generally gave east-west streets the right of way. Defendant
contended that he had right of way under the state act' which
provided that the vehicle approaching from the right has the
right of way. Held, irrespective of which driver was entitled to
the right of way, both were guilty of negligence-suit dismissed.
Burden v. Capitol Stores, Incorporated,200 La. 329, 8 So. (2d) 45
(1942).
The Louisiana decisions rendered on intersection accidents
involving right of way are uniformly based upon general negligence principles. The courts, by this means, effectively dodge the
right of way question and are not put in the position of having
to uphold either the statute or the municipal ordinance.
Prior to the enactment of statutory provisions the rule of the
road was that the first to reach the intersection had the right of
way.4 Rules giving the right of way to certain streets set a standard of care, but do not eliminate the general requirement of reasonable care under the circumstances. Louisiana recognizes that
1. Baton Rouge City Ordinance.
2. La. Act 286 of 1938, tit. II, § 3, Rule 11 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5216].

3. A more complete statement of the facts is given in the appellate case.
Burden v. Capitol Stores, Inc., 4 So.(2d) 62 (La. App. 1941).
4. Johnston v. Worley, 3 La. App. 675 (1926).

